British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343 (1984)
|Abstract||The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. Section 2 suggests three major reasons for the emergence of this assumption in the seventeenth century: the mental-physical gap, the causal theory of perception, and epistemological considerations regarding the status of the sensory given. In the last section a critical discussion is presented. The passivity assumption is found to have serious empirical and theoretical flaws|
|Keywords||Dualism Epistemology Passivity Perception Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sonia Sedivy (2004). Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Empiricism's Third Dogma: Why Perception is Not an Amalgam of Sensation and Conceptualization. Philosophical Investigations 27 (1):1-33.
Davide Panagia (2009). The Political Life of Sensation. Duke University Press.
David W. Hamlyn (1994). Perception, Sensation, and Non-Conceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):139-53.
Sandra B. Rosenthal & Patrick L. Bourgeois (1990). Sensation, Perception and Immediacy: Mead and Merleau-Ponty. Southwest Philosophy Review 6 (1):105-111.
Nicholas Humphrey (2001). Doing It My Way: Sensation, Perception – and Feeling Red. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):987-987.
Aaron Ben-Zeev & Michael Strauss (1984). The Dualistic Approach to Perception. Man and World 17 (1):3-18.
E. L. Mascall (1964). Perception and Sensation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:259-272.
Ramon M. Lemos (1964). Sensation, Perception, and the Given. Ratio 6 (June):63-80.
Pete Mandik (2005). Action-Oriented Representation. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads92 ( #9,241 of 722,871 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,871 )
How can I increase my downloads?