The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?

European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506 (2011)
Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As we shall see, the two allegedly very different rival views are much less different than has been thought: their structure is extremely similar, their strategies are extremely similar, and they can both face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’ in the same way. Thus, I argue in favour of a certain kind of equivalence between the two views; I discuss a Strong and a Weak version of this claim; and I provide reasons for endorsing the former. I also discuss the parallel between this pair of views about the nature of time and another analogous pair of views: the bundle theory and the substratum theory about the nature of material objects, with respect to the problem with Identity of Indiscernibles
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00396.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Jiri Benovsky, The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Eli Hirsch (2005). Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.
Galen Strawson (1997). The Self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:405-28.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Claudio Mazzola (2016). Still Foes: Benovsky on Relationism and Substantivalism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):247-260.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

265 ( #10,351 of 1,940,955 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

22 ( #25,481 of 1,940,955 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.