Vagueness : a statistical epistemicist approach

Teorema (3):97-112 (2011)
There are three main traditional accounts of vagueness : one takes it as a genuinely metaphysical phenomenon, one takes it as a phenomenon of ignorance, and one takes it as a linguistic or conceptual phenomenon. In this paper I first very briefly present these views, especially the epistemicist and supervaluationist strategies, and shortly point to some well-known problems that the views carry. I then examine a 'statistical epistemicist' account of vagueness that is designed to avoid precisely these problems – it will be a view that provides an account of the phenomenon of vagueness as coming from our linguistic practices, while insisting that meaning supervenes on use, and that our use of vague terms does yield sharp and precise meanings, which we ignore, thus allowing bivalence to hold.
Keywords vagueness  epistemicism  epistemic vagueness
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    Susanne Bobzien (2002). Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
    Achille C. Varzi (2003). Vagueness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    28 ( #52,622 of 1,088,905 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    11 ( #10,082 of 1,088,905 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.