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- Paul Benacerraf (1965). What Numbers Could Not Be. Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
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This is a dialogue in which five characters are involved. Various issues in the philosophy of mathematics are discussed. Among those issues are these: numbers as abstract objects, our knowledge of numbers as abstract objects, a proof as showing a mathematical statement to be true as opposed to the statement being true in virtue of having a proof.
John taurek has argued that, where choices must be made between alternatives that affect different numbers of people, the numbers are not, by themselves, morally relevant. this is because we "must" take "losses-to" the persons into account (and these don't sum), but "must not" consider "losses-of" persons (because we must not treat persons like objects). i argue that the numbers are always ethically relevant, and that they may sometimes be the decisive consideration.
I follow standard mathematical practice and theory to argue that the natural numbers are the finite von Neumann ordinals. I present the reasons standardly given for identifying the natural numbers with the finite von Neumann's (e.g., recursiveness; well-ordering principles; continuity at transfinite limits; minimality; and identification of n with the set of all numbers less than n). I give a detailed mathematical demonstration that 0 is { } and for every natural number n, n is the set of all natural numbers less than n. Natural numbers are sets. They are the finite von Neumann ordinals.
In this paper, I suggest that infinite numbers are large finite numbers, and that infinite numbers, properly understood, are 1) of the structure omega + (omega* + omega)Ө + omega*, and 2) the part is smaller than the whole. I present an explanation of these claims in terms of epistemic limitations. I then consider the importance, part of which is demonstrating the contradiction that lies at the heart of Cantorian set theory: the natural numbers are too large to be counted by any finite number, but too small to be counted by any infinite number – there is no number of natural numbers.
This is a dialogue in the philosophy of mathematics. The dialogue descends from the confident assertion that there are infinitely many numbers to an unresolved bewilderment about how we can know there are any numbers at all. At every turn the dialogue brings us only to realize more fully how little is clear to us in our thinking about mathematics.
Humans possess two nonverbal systems capable of representing numbers, both limited in their representational power: the first one represents numbers in an approximate fashion, and the second one conveys information about small numbers only. Conception of exact large numbers has therefore been thought to arise from the manipulation of exact numerical symbols. Here, we focus on two fundamental properties of the exact numbers as prerequisites to the concept of EXACT NUMBERS : the fact that all numbers can be generated by a successor function and the fact that equality between numbers can be defined in an exact fashion. We discuss some recent findings assessing how speakers of Munduruc (an Amazonian language), and young Western children (3-4 years old) understand these fundamental properties of numbers.
Abstract A number is the number of a class which is an objective, nonactual, mathematical object. The concept of class is analyzed and it is concluded that a number is the number of a pure founded class. A tempting strategy of explaining numbers away is rejected. Some well?known definitions of numbers are analyzed and it is concluded that this analysis purports the thesis that the unique notion of number does not exist. Numbers are conventional. Nevertheless, an argument is offered purporting the thesis that von Neumann's ordinal numbers are the ordinal numbers. Accordingly, the corresponding von Neumann's cardinal numbers are the numbers.
A number is the number of a class which is an objective, nonactual, mathematical object. The concept of class is analyzed and it is concluded that a number is the number of a pure founded class. A tempting strategy of explaining numbers away is rejected. Some well-known definitions of numbers are analyzed and it is concluded that this analysis purports the thesis that the unique notion of number does not exist. Numbers are conventional. Nevertheless, an argument is offered purporting the thesis that von Neumann's ordinal numbers are the ordinal numbers. Accordingly, the corresponding von Neumann's cardinal numbers are the numbers.
This paper addresses John Burgess's answer to the ‘Benacerraf Problem’: How could we come justifiably to believe anything implying that there are numbers, given that it does not make sense to ascribe location or causal powers to numbers? Burgess responds that we should look at how mathematicians come to accept: There are prime numbers greater than 1010 That, according to Burgess, is how one can come justifiably to believe something implying that there are numbers. This paper investigates what lies behind Burgess's answer and ends up as a rebuttal to Burgess's reasoning.
What Numbers Could Not Be’) that an adequate account of the numbers and our arithmetic practice must satisfy not only the conditions usually recognized to be necessary: (a) identify some w-sequence as the numbers, and (b) correctly characterize the cardinality relation that relates a set to a member of that sequence as its cardinal number—it must also satisfy a third condition: the ‘<’ of the sequence must be recursive. This paper argues that adding this further condition was a mistake—any w-sequence would do, no matter how undecidable its ‘<’ relation.
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