Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it

Noûs 37 (3):471-97 (2003)
The basic form of the exclusion problem is by now very, very familiar. 2 Start with the claim that the physical realm is causally complete: every physical thing that happens has a sufficient physical cause. Add in the claim that the mental and the physical are distinct. Toss in some claims about overdetermination, give it a stir, and voilá—suddenly it looks as though the mental never causes anything, at least nothing physical. As it is often put, the physical does all the work, and there is nothing left for the mental to do.
Keywords Compatibilism  Dualism  Epistemology  Exclusion  Overdeterminism
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0068.00447
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Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
Brandon Carey (2010). Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251 - 262.

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