Agent reliabilism and the problem of clairvoyance

This paper argues that John Greco’s agent reliabilism fails in its attempt to meet the double requirement of accounting for the internalist intuition that knowledge requires sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence and evading the charge of psychological implausibility.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00120.x
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References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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