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- Hugo Bergman (1965). Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):94-99.
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Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about intrinsic value made by Brentano and his students, and discusses their relevance to theodicy and the problem of evil. Brentano, as the teacher of Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, and others, stands at the origin of the phenomenological tradition and of the Polish school of philosophy that developed after World War I. He has also had considerable influence on Anglo-American philosophy. This book will interest those concerned with the origins of phenomenological value theory and more generally with the connections between ethics and philosophical psychology.
From FRANZ BRENTANO's manuscripts for his Vienna lectures 1888/89. Photo by his
son, Dr. John CM Brentano, Highland Park, Illinois. ...
INTRODUCTION TO FRANZ BRENTANO'S PHILOSOPHY i. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION! i.
Most of the editors of F. Brentano's works and his commentators have a ...
: Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely Òon the wayÓ to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project.
There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of Brentano’s works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano’s works, letters, manuscripts, memoir’s, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered. Moreover some Brentano’s scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher’s works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher’s final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo’s recent discovery, they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano’s own theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano’s main intention was to develop a scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his mind until his death. It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano’s works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed.
Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher and his position in the history of philosophy. Good corrections have been made in the recent analytic literature by David Bell (1990), Dermot Moran (1996), and Barry Smith (1994) among others. But there is also another, more purely philosophical lesson to be learned from the proper understanding of Brentano’s views on this matter. This is that Brentano’s struggles with the concept of intentionality reveal a fundamental division between different ways of thinking about intentionality, an division which Brentano himself does not make fully clear. Making the nature of this division explicit is the aim of this paper.
The influence of Brentano on the emergence of Husserl's notion of
intentionality has been usually perceived as the key of understanding the history of
intentionality, since Brentano was credited with the discovery of intentionality, and
Husserl was his discipline. This much debated question is to be revisited in the
present essay by incorporating recent advances in Brentano scholarship and by
focusing on Husserl's very first work, his habilitation essay (Über den Begriff der
Zahl), which followed immediately after his study years at Brentano, and also on
manuscript notes from the same period. It is to be shown that (i) although Brentano
failed to enact a direct influence on Husserl's notion of intentionality (much in line
with K. Schuhmann's claim), (ii) yet the core of Brentano's notion remained operative
in Husserl's theory of relations, which is seemingly influenced by John Stuart Mill
and Hermann Lotze. This investigation is intended as a contribution towards the proper
understanding of the complexities of Husserl's early philosophy.
I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts.
Kraus, O. Biographical sketch of Franz Brentano.--Stumpf, C. Reminiscences of Franz Brentano.--Husserl, E. Reminiscences of Franz Brentano.--Gilson, E. Brentano's interpretation of medieval philosophy.--Gilson, L. Franz Brentano on science and philosophy.--Titchener, E. B. Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology.--Chisholm, R. M. Brentano's descriptive psychology.--De Boer, T. The descriptive method of Franz Brentano.--Spiegelberg, H. Intention and intentionality in the scholastics, Brentano and Husserl.--Marras, A. Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionality.--Chisholm, R. M. Intentional inexistence.--McAlister, L. L. Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality.--Chisholm, R. M. Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion.--Moore, G. E. Review of Franz Brentano's The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong.--Franks, G. Was G. E. Moore mistaken about Brentano?--Kotarbinski, T. Franz Brentano as reist.--Terrell, D.B. Brentano's argument for reismus.--Bergman, H. Brentano's theory of induction.--Kraus, O. Toward a phenomenognosy of time consciousness.
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