Online research in philosophy

The present paper uses the theme of dialectic and dialogue to begin unraveling the similarities and differences between the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and H.G. Gadamer. Ricoeur is shown to distance himself from Heidegger by insisting on a dimension of explanation and distanciation (which he sometimes identifies with Plato's `descending dialectic') that cannot be reduced to, or absorbed by, understanding and appropriation. This same move, however, leads him to reject Platonic dialogue, with the attendant prioritizing of oral conversation over the written text, as a model for hermeneutics. Ricoeur therefore sees in Gadamer's recourse to such a model a regression to the problematic position of Heidegger. Yet the conception of philosophy as dialectical and dialogical which Gadamer finds in Plato is capable of responding to Ricoeur's objections. Where the fundamental difference between the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer emerges is in the question of whether experience is fundamentally dialectical and whether language is inherently dialogical.

Hans-Georg Gadamer is often criticized for his account of the fusions of horizons as the ideal resolution of dialogue. I argue that in fact it is an excellent account of the successful resolution of dialogue, but only in light of a proper understanding of what Gadamer means by 'horizon' and how then horizons are fused. I do this by showing how Gadamer is drawing on the technical sense of 'horizon' found in Edmund Husserl's and Martin Heidegger's phenomenologies. In the process I show why a prominent criticism of Gadamer's account of the fusion of horizons, a criticism presented most forcefully by E. D. Hirsch, is mistaken.

Often, respectable scholars attack the soundness of Heidegger's "violent" interpretations of Hölderlin (and others). In this case, Dieter Henrich offers a particularly harsh assessment of Heidegger's interpretation of " Andenken." Hans-Georg Gadamer, student of Heidegger and teacher of Henrich, attempts to bring harmony where none seems possible. A study of the three interpretations indicates that scholarship alone is sufficient to reach a decision on the strength of the interpretations.

This essay makes two claims. The first, exegetical, point shows that there are Husserlian elements in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that are usually overlooked.The second, systematic, claim takes issue with the fact that Gadamer saw himself in alliance with the project of the later Heidegger. It would have been more fruitful had Gadamer aligned himself with Husserl and the Enlightenment tradition. Following Heidegger in his concept of “effective history,” Gadamer risks betraying the main tenets of the Enlightenment by shifting the weight from subjectivity to effective history as the “agent” in history. This is not a wholesale dismissal of Gadamer’s project, however. The problem in Gadamer’s effective history can be remedied by insisting, with Husserl, on the subjective character of effective history. Gadamer was right to criticize Husserl’s idea of a transcendental genesis, but went too far in giving up the idea of human subjectivity as the agent in history.

Axel Honneth investigates an ambiguity in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. In Truth and Method, Gadamer lays out key forms of reciprocal recognition. By means of them, he can subject historical transmission to normative appraisal. Gadamer makes the recognitional interaction relative only to an 'I' and 'Thou', omitting reference to an objective 'Third'. Honneth claims that Gadamer posits this restriction based on the influence of Heidegger's Mitwelt concept. Honneth claims, however, that Gadamer's model fails to explain the possibility of a hermeneutic openness to agents who are not in close personal proximity to us. Instead, Honneth argues that the concrete other in I/Thou relations must be supplemented by a standpoint where the concrete and generalized other continually and reciprocally correct one another. Key Words: concrete other • Gadamer • generalized other • Heidegger • hermeneutics • intersubjectivity • recognition.

A collection of essays including one by Gadamer himself reflecting on his life and work. There are also special sections linking Gadamer to the work of other major philosophers, including Heidegger, Ricoeur, Barthes and Derrida.

Partindo do presuposto de que Heidegger foi o autor que mais influenciou a obra de Hans-Georg Gadamer, o presente artigo visa esclarecer os contornos desta influência, analisando alguns dos principais temas do pensamento gadameriano, a saber: a historicidade da existência humana, a reabilitação da categoria do preconceito, a arte, a linguagem e a verdade. Mostra ainda como a orientação humanista de Gadamer constitui o principal ponto de divergência relativamente a Heidegger. Defende, por conseguinte, que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer pode ser interpretada como uma apropriação humanista do pensamento heideggeriano. /// Taking for granted that Heidegger was the author that most deeply influenced Gadamer's work, the present article aims at a clarification of such influence by examining some of the key themes of Gadamer's thought: the historicity of human existence, the rehabilitation of prejudice, as well as the reflection on art, language, and truth. The article explains thus how Gadamer's humanism constitutes the main point of divergence from Heidegger. It claims, moreover, that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can be considered a humanistic appropriation of Heidegger's thought.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) is widely recognized as the leading exponent of philosophical hermeneutics. The essays in this collection examine Gadamer's biography, the core of hermeneutical theory, and the significance of his work for ethics, aesthetics, the social sciences, and theology. There is full consideration of Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel, Heidegger and the Greeks, as well as his relation to modernity, critical theory and poststructuralism.

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how Gadamer's hermeneutics synthesizes the insights of both Heidegger and Dilthey in order to introduce a new hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based not only on the priority of ontology, as Heidegger insists, and neither is it only a product of life which can be objectively understood through study and rigorous method, as Dilthey suggests. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the bringing together of ontology in terms of history. By this synthesis Gadamer not only places himself within the context of a Lebensphilosophie, but also shows that it is within language that Being can be disclosed according to a lived context. Throughout this paper the philosophies ofDilthey and Heidegger are explicated within a historical context as to bring out how, and why, Gadamer sees the need to surpass these philosophies. Through Gadamer's philosophy of play and the game, language, the dialogical model, application, and the fusion of horizons we can see how Gadamer's critique and questioning of these two philosophy leads to his new hermeneutics. Special attention is paid to the role in which these two contrasting philosophies were used to complement each other in the product of Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics as it is presented in his major work Truth andMethod. For Gadamer, the task of understanding is never complete. Therefore, his hermeneutics remains a dynamic structure with which we can always question the past and our traditions. This paper seeks to show his philosophical movements within these questions.

Gadamer was fond of telling of his last meeting with his old teacher Martin Heidegger: ‘You are right’, said Heidegger, ‘language is conversation [Sprache ist Gespräch].’1 We might argue as to what such a comment, assuming Gadamer remembered it aright, would really have meant for Heidegger – whether it would have constituted a significant revision of any view to which Heidegger was himself committed.2 The fact that Gadamer felt it worth repeating, however, does indicate something of Gadamer’s conception of the relation between his thought and that of Heidegger, as well as of the centrality of the idea at issue in his own thought. Indeed, elsewhere Gadamer has commented that.