Cognitive impenetrability, phenomenology, and nonconceptual content
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):367-368 (1999)
| Abstract | This commentary discusses Pylyshyn's model of perceptual processing in the light of the philosophical distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual content of perception. Pylyshyn's processing distinction maps onto an important distinction in the phenomenology of visual perception. | |||||||||
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