David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436 (2005)
Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (1997). Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
Michael Bergmann (2004). Externalist Justification Without Reliability. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.
Citations of this work BETA
Alex Worsnip (2015). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Jane Friedman (2013). Suspended Judgment. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Declan Smithies (2016). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.
Allan Hazlett (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3):205-223.
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