Defeaters and higher-level requirements

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436 (2005)
Abstract
Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x
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Jane Friedman (2013). Suspended Judgment. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Alex Worsnip (2015). The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Declan Smithies (2016). Perception and the External World. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.

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