Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436 (2005)
|Abstract||Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the objection that externalists who endorse this error theory will be forced to accept a radical form of scepticism|
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