Inquiry 39 (1):121-39 (1996)
|Abstract||Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind?body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ?in the head? and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self?knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self?knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments|
|Keywords||Authority Epistemology Externalism Incompatibilism Knowledge Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Steven Yalowitz (1999). Davidson's Social Externalism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.
Kourken Michaelian (2009). Reliabilism and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):199-224.
Nicholas Shea (2003). Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.
Andre Leclerc (2005). Davidson's Externalism and Swampman's Troublesome Biography. Principia 9 (1-2):159-175.
R. (1994). Internalism, Externalism, and Davidson's Conception of the Mental. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
Jonathan Berg (1998). First-Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh-Knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.
Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.
Jeff Malpas (1994). Self-Knowledge and Scepticism. Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #20,251 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,644 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?