David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 39 (1):121-139 (1996)
Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind?body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ?in the head? and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self?knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self?knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments.
|Keywords||Authority Epistemology Externalism Incompatibilism Knowledge Davidson, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Steven Yalowitz (1999). Davidson's Social Externalism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.
Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Externalism and First-Person Authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.
Jonathan Berg (1998). First-Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh-Knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Social Externalism and First-Person Authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
R. (1994). Internalism, Externalism, and Davidson's Conception of the Mental. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Andre Leclerc (2005). Davidson's Externalism and Swampman's Troublesome Biography. Principia 9 (1-2):159-175.
Nicholas Shea (2003). Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.
Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):199-224.
Kourken Michaelian (2009). Reliabilism and Privileged Access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
Jeff Malpas (1994). Self-Knowledge and Scepticism. Erkenntnis 40 (2):165-184.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #62,069 of 1,796,218 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #349,835 of 1,796,218 )
How can I increase my downloads?