Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge

Noûs 30 (2):262-275 (1996)
Tyler Burge and other externalists about mental content have tried to accommodate privileged self-knowledge and to neutralize skepticism about one's ability to authoritatively know one's present thoughts. I show that, though Burgean compatibilism explains knowing it is p I believe, it doesn't explain how I can have privileged knowledge that the state I occupy is a state of believing rather than, say, a state of doubting. Moreover, given externalism, self-knowledge of attitudinal component is vulnerable to a certain kind of error and so doesn't have the same kind of privilege as self-knowledge of current content.
Keywords Attitude  Epistemology  Externalism  Individualism  Self-knowledge  Burge, T
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DOI 10.2307/2216296
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Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
Finn Spicer (2009). On Always Being Right (About What One is Thinking). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 137-160.

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