Free will and the mind–body problem

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19 (2010)
Abstract
Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described
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    Bernard Berofsky (2003). Identification, the Self, and Autonomy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):199-220.
    Bernard Berofsky (2006). The Myth of Source. Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.

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