Journal of Business Ethics 63 (2):119 - 130 (2006)
|Abstract||The U.S. government embraces the concepts of privatization and market competition, but the realm of contracting shows that it has not always been able to put its principles into practice. Although the contracting system is supposed to be open and competitive, in recent years the government has often awarded contracts with little or no competitive bidding, has chosen to award mostly cost-plus type contracts that force the government to assume more of the risk, and lacked efficiency in monitoring and overseeing private contractors. While the number and value of contracts have increased, the workforce to oversee these contracts has been reduced, preventing the government from adequately enforcing compliance with the contractors, and the government has not made use of past performance evaluations in its contracting system. Private contractors that do business with the U.S. government are for the most part well-established firms with ample resources and inside contacts; many contracts are still being awarded on preferential treatment and to the larger and well-established contractors.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Sylla (1991). The Progressive Era and the Political Economy of Big Government∗. Critical Review 5 (4):531-557.
Thomas W. Dunfee (1991). Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts. Business Ethics Quarterly 1 (1):23-51.
Yongqiang Gao (2011). Government Intervention, Perceived Benefit, and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China. Journal of Business Ethics 104 (2):175-184.
Angelique EagleWoman, Strate V. A-1 Contractors: Intrusion Into the Sovereign Domain of Native Nations.
Paul Lansing & Kimberly Burkard (1991). Ethics and the Defense Procurement System. Journal of Business Ethics 10 (5):357 - 364.
Tom Walker (2012). Ulysses Contracts in Medicine. Law and Philosophy 31 (1):77-98.
Ryan Spellecy (2003). Reviving Ulysses Contracts. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13 (4):373-392.
Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli (1999). Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs. Theory and Decision 46 (1):23-50.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #37,849 of 548,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?