Gupta's Gambit

Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39 (2011)
Abstract
After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
Keywords Gupta  Empiricism  The given  Experience  Entitlement  Interdependence
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    References found in this work BETA
    Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
    A. Gupta (2006). Experience and Knowledge. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.

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