Online research in philosophy

Within human communities, the phenomenon of rules is ubiquitous. We have the allimportant rules that are codified by our law; we have rules that are not authoritatively written down, but are usually followed (like the rule that if somebody helps me, I should be prepared to help him in turn); we have traffic rules; and the rules of various games and sports. Yet, from the scientific viewpoint, rules are not easy to account for. How is their emergence to be explained (in a way compatible with evolution), and how is their existence to be construed, especially in cases when they are not written down? Are we to consider a rule as primarily a linguistic object; or are we to reduce it to some regularity of behavior? Neither of these two forms of existence holds much allure. Firstly, insofar as some rules clearly exist without being recorded, there is no linguistic object with which they can be identified. (After all, we talk about the encoding of the law, which seems to suggest that the law articulates something existing independently of the code.) And secondly, reducing the existence of a rule to a plain regularity of behavior would extinguish any distinction between billiard balls 'following the rules' of mechanics and human subjects following the rules of their society. Hence it would seem that, though there must be more to rules than regularities, at least some rules must be capable of existing exclusively 'within' human conduct – being, as Willfrid Sellars (1949, 299) put it, written "in flesh and blood, or nerve and sinew, rather than in pen and ink".

Just about any proponent of a rule-based theory of morality must eventually confront the question of how to resolve confl icts among the rules that the theory endorses. Is there a priority rule specifying which rules must yield to which, as in Rawls’s lexical ordering of the fi rst principle of his theory of justice over the second?3 Must the agent intuitively bal-.

What makes for a good explanation of a person’s actions? Their reasons, or soa natural reply goes. But how do reasons function as part of explanations, that is, within an account of the causes of action? Here philosophers divide concerning the logical relation in which reasons stand to actions. For, tradition holds, reasons evaluatively characterized must be causally inert, inasmuch as the normative features cannot be found in any account of the empirical/descriptive. To countenance reasons as causes thus seems to imply some degree of normative involvement in causal explanation. Mark Risjord opts for full normative involvement while David Henderson insistently denies a role to norms in explanation. Stueber occupies an intermediate position here. I question just whether there exists some "special" problem regarding norms, at least in the form which, I take it, all three of the authors I discuss assume there to be one. Key Words: reasons • causes • norms • rules • explanation.

In this paper I argue against the holistic claim that the description and explanation of human behaviour is irreducibly social in nature. I focus on the more specific thesis that human behaviour is rule-guided and that 'rule' is an irreducibly social notion. Against this claim I defend a teleofunctional and reductionist view. Following Millikan (1990), who argues that 'rule' can be explicated in functional terms, I extend her argument to cover social rules as well, and argue that rules are laws. I conclude that human rule-guided behaviour can be described and explained in functional, and in the end causal, i.e. causal-historical, terms.

I argue against the idea (made popular by H.L.A. Hart) that the key to a legal system is its "rule of recognition." I argue that much of the work allegedly done by a rule of recognition is either done by a different kind of secondary rule (what Hart called "a rule of change") or it is not done at all (and doesn't have to be done). A rule of change tells us the procedures that must be followed and the substantive conditions that must be satisfied if law is to be changed legislatively; and a judge "recognizes" changes simply by using this checklist. In common law, there is no clear rule of change (because we are profoundly ambivalent about judicial lawmaking). But we get by without one, and without a determinate rule of recognition that would tell us precisely how to infer rules from precedents. It is quite liberating, really, to abandon the idea of a rule of recognition. Apart from anything else, it relieves us from having to participate in endless debates about whether the US Constitution is (or contains) a rule of recognition for American law. The Constitution contains rules of change; that's what matters.

This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit’s approach to the problem how a finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. Negatively, I argue that Pettit’s so-called ethocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem that he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit’s distinctive general approach to the problem. I conclude that what is needed is a ‘no-priority’ account of rule-exemplification: that is, an account that (a) affirms the constitutive role of agents’ responses in the exemplification of rules but (b) denies the explanatory priority given to such responses in Pettit’s theory.

Lewis Carroll’s 1895 paper “Achilles and the Tortoise” showed that we need a distinction between rules of inference and premises. We cannot, on pain of regress, treat all rules simply as further premises in an argument. But Carroll’s paper doesn’t say very much about what rules there must be. Indeed, it is consistent with what Carroll says there to think that the only rule is -elimination. You might think that modern Bayesians, who seem to think that the only rule of inference they need is conditionalisation, have taken just this lesson from Carroll. But obviously nothing in Carroll’s argument rules out there being other rules as well.

The paper introduces the concept of polar decision rules and establishes that majority rules are polar rules. We identify second best rules and penultimate rules in cases that majority rules are optimal or the most inferior, respectively. We especially specify the almost expert rule and the almost majority rule as the secondary rules of the expert and majority rules, respectively.

This paper develops the theory that a set of rules is consistent if it is not possible that (1) the conditions of the rules in the set are all satisfied, (2) there is no exception to either one of the rules, and (3) the consequences of the rules are incompatible. To this purpose the notion of consistency is generalised to make it cover rules and is relativised to some background of constraints.This theory is formalised by means of Rule Logic, in which rules are treated as constraints on the possible worlds in which they exist. Rule Logic itself is introduced by giving a model-theory for it. It is characterised by means of constraints on worlds that are possible according to Rule Logic.

This article will discuss the difficulties of providing a plausible account of rule following in the social realm. It will show that the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify the wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices, as social theorists like Bourdieu or Dreyfus have argued. Instead it will be shown that rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions. In this manner one is able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule. Key Words: rules • norms • explanation • Bourdieu • Winch.