David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 110 (3):399-417 (1997)
Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subjects belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Kvanvig (2012). Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.
Trenton Merricks (2003). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.
Christopher R. Green (2007). Suing One's Sense Faculties for Fraud: 'Justifiable Reliance' in the Law as a Clue to Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):49-90.
Similar books and articles
Michael Thune (2010). 'Partial Defeaters' and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):355-372.
Brie Gertler (2012). Understanding the Internalism-Externalism Debate: What is the Boundary of the Thinker? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):51-75.
Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 125--42.
Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the Metaphysics of Internalism and Externalism. Disputatio 18 (2):1 - 24.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.
Renata Ziemińska (2006). Two Notions of the Internal and Goldman's Epistemic Externalism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):395-400.
B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
James McBain (2005). Epistemological Practice and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):283-291.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads72 ( #19,348 of 1,101,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #27,854 of 1,101,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?