Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?

Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24 (2007)
Abstract
This paper is a response to Peter Klein's “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning” (also in this issue of this journal). After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
Keywords infinitism  foundationalism
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References found in this work BETA
David B. Annis (1978). A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Keith DeRose (1992). Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
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