Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (4):395-412 (2010)
|Abstract||When seeking to coordinate in a game with imperfect information, it is often relevant for a player to know what other players know. Keeping track of the information acquired in a play of infinite duration may, however, lead to infinite hierarchies of higher-order knowledge. We present a construction that makes explicit which higher-order knowledge is relevant in a game and allows us to describe a class of games that admit coordinated winning strategies with finite memory|
|Keywords||Infinite games Imperfect information Distributed strategies Multiplayer games|
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