David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (2006)
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
|Keywords||Externalism (Philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind Knowledge, Theory of Individualism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$22.00 used (74% off) $22.75 new (73% off) $63.41 direct from Amazon (25% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.B46 2006|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jack Lyons (2011). Circularity, Reliability, and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
Nicholas Silins (2012). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Similar books and articles
John Gibbons (2006). Access Externalism. Mind 115 (457):19-39.
Michael Bergmann (2008). Reidian Externalism. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.
Sven Bernecker (2006). Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3):355 - 366.
Joe Cruz & John Pollock (2004). The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 125--42.
S. Hetherington (2007). Review: Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (464):1088-1092.
William Harper (1998). Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism. Synthese 116 (1):27-49.
Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads81 ( #18,644 of 1,139,861 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #28,326 of 1,139,861 )
How can I increase my downloads?