David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 183 (1):7-26 (2011)
Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status
|Keywords||Kant Proper science Objective grounding Mathematics|
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References found in this work BETA
Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant's Concepts of Justification. Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
Willem R. de Jong & Arianna Betti (2010). The Classical Model of Science: A Millennia-Old Model of Scientific Rationality. Synthese 174 (2):185-203.
Michael Friedman (1992). Kant and the Exact Sciences. Harvard University Press.
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William Harper (2002). Newton's Argument for Universal Gravitation. In I. Bernard Cohen & George E. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Newton. Cambridge University Press. 174--201.
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