David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35 (2011)
We outline a neo-Meinongian framework labeled as Modal Meinongian Metaphysics (MMM) to account for the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse. Several competing accounts of fictional objects are originated by the fact that our talking of them mirrors incoherent intuitions: mainstream theories of fiction privilege some such intuitions, but are forced to account for others via complicated paraphrases of the relevant sentences. An ideal theory should resort to as few paraphrases as possible. In Sect. 1, we make this explicit via two methodological principles, called the Minimal Revision and the Acceptability Constraint. In Sect. 2, we introduce the standard distinction between internal and external fictional discourse. In Sects. 3–5, we discuss the approaches of (traditional) Meinongianism, Fictionalism, and Realism—and their main troubles. In Sect. 6 we propose our MMM approach. This is based upon (1) a modal semantics including impossible worlds (Subsect. 6.1); (2) a qualified Comprehension Principle for objects (Subsect. 6.2); (3) a notion of existence-entailment for properties (Subsect. 6.3). In Sect. 7 we present a formal semantics for MMM based upon a representation operator. And in Sect. 8 we have a look at how MMM solves the problems of the three aforementioned theories.
|Keywords||Fictional objects Meinongianism Modal Meinongianism Fictionalism|
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References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise (1997). Information and Impossibilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):488-515.
J. C. Beall (2003). Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic. Oxford University Press.
Francesco Berto (2013). Impossible Worlds. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013).
Francesco Berto (2010). Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
Gregory Currie (1990). The Nature of Fiction. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthieu Fontaine & Shahid Rahman (2014). Towards a Semantics for the Artifactual Theory of Fiction and Beyond. Synthese 191 (3):499-516.
Tatjana von Solodkoff & Richard Woodward (2013). Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):558-583.
Tatjana Solodkoff & Richard Woodward (2013). Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):558-583.
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