Report a bug on this page | Sign in | Create an account
 
PhilPapers home blank

Online research in philosophy


Entries: 207,591  New this week: 131
blank
 General search   Category finder 
advanced search | help | use + and * as usual.
Type words to match in category names
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?

Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.

  • Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric Disorders. Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493.
    Schizophrenia in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    Normativity in Value Theory, Miscellaneous
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar
    41 downloads  |  Added to index:2009-01-27  |  Mark as duplicate |  Delete from index


Discussion of Jose Luis Bermudez, Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders
Other forums | There are no threads in this forum | Start a new thread First post Latest post Total
Nothing in this forum yet.


Similar books and articles
  • 92.4Andrew Reisner, Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.
    It has become commonplace among philosophers who work on reasons to distinguish between normativity and rationality.1 On this view, normativity concerns what one might think of as genuine reasons and oughts, although different theories of normativity will give different accounts of what reasons there genuinely are and what one ought to do or believe. Rationality, on the other hand, concerns our mental states, or relations among them. While there are reasons for having certain mental states: intentions, beliefs, fears that, and (...) so on, those reasons may or may not coincide with what rationality requires or permits. In this paper, I shall take up the assumption rationality and normativity are distinct, in order to explore some difficult questions concerning the nature of rational requirements.2 Two influential theories of rationality both see rationality as being comprised of rational requirements. These theories disagree, however, about how these rational requirements should.. (shrink)
    Rationality in Epistemology
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 87.9Jason Bridges, Rationality, Normativity and Transparency.
    Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny’s defense of it—especially his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it isn’t—is unsuccessful. I close with a sketch of an alternative proposal, one that provides for a genuine (...) normative role for rationality while defusing the attendant problems. I’m currently working on a paper, “The Normativity of Rationality” that offers an alternative solution to the problems attendant to ascribing normativity to rationality. (shrink)
    Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action
    Normativity in Value Theory, Miscellaneous
    In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 73.3Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455).
    Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. I ask how the normativity of rationality—the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality—is related to the normativity of reasons—the sense (...) in which we ‘ought’ to have the attitudes what we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to ‘bootstrapping’, because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have ‘wide scope’. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this ‘Transparency Account’, rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative ‘pressure’ that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have. (shrink)
    Normativity of Practical Reason in Philosophy of Action
    Rational Requirements in Epistemology
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 71.9Andrew Reisner, Is There Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?
    An important advance in normativity research over the last decade is an increased understanding of the distinction, and difference, between normativity and rationality. Normativity concerns or picks out a broad set of concepts that have in common that they are, put loosely, guiding. For example, consider two commonly used normative concepts: that of a normative reason and that of ought. To have a normative reason to perform some action is for there to be something that counts in favour of performing (...) that action. Likewise with ought, when there is sufficient evidence for something, one ought to believe it (at least under normal circumstances). Not all guidance need be directed towards a specific state or a specific action. Subject to the requirements of normativity, too, are relations. It is commonly believed, for example, that we ought not to hold contradictory beliefs.1 At least some of the requirements that concern relations amongst an agent’s mental states are, or seem, distinctive. Agents who fail to satisfy these requirements are considered, at least to some degree, irrational. On many current views, being irrational is distinct in some way from not being how one ought to be; rationality is a concept distinct from normativity. Much of the literature on this topic over the last decade stems from attempts to capture the characteristic features of the requirements of rationality. Two influential views in particular did much to set the agenda. The first of these two was put forward John Broome.2 His view, the particulars of which I shall discuss in more detail below, is that the requirements of rationality could be expressed using a normative relation, which he calls a ‘normative requirement’. Normative requirements are conditionals governed by an all-thingsconsidered ought. In the case of rationality, the conditional is made up entirely of mental states.. (shrink)
    Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action
    Reasons and Oughts in Philosophy of Action
    Epistemic Normativity, Misc in Epistemology
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 70.9Joel Paris (2008). Prescriptions for the Mind: A Critical View of Contemporary Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    Neuroscience and psychiatry -- Psychotherapy and psychiatry -- Diagnosis in psychiatry -- The boundaries of mental disorders -- Mood and mental illness -- Psychiatry's problem children -- Evidence-based psychiatry -- Psychiatric drugs: miracles and limitations -- Talk therapies: the need for a unified method -- Psychiatry in practice -- Training psychiatrists -- Psychiatry and society -- The future of psychiatry.
    No categories
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 70.6Mona Gupta (2007). Does Evidence-Based Medicine Apply to Psychiatry? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2):103.
    Evidence-based psychiatry (EBP) has arisen through the application of evidence-based medicine (EBM) to psychiatry. However, there may be aspects of psychiatric disorders and treatments that do not conform well to the assumptions of EBM. This paper reviews the ongoing debate about evidence-based psychiatry and investigates the applicability, to psychiatry, of two basic methodological features of EBM: prognostic homogeneity of clinical trial groups and quantification of trial outcomes. This paper argues that EBM may not be the best way to pursue psychiatric (...) knowledge given the particular features of psychiatric disorders and their treatments. As a result, psychiatry may have to develop its own standards for rigour and validity. This paper concludes that EBM has had a powerful influence on how psychiatry investigates and understands mental disorders. Psychiatry could influence EBM in return, reshaping it in ways that are more clinically useful and congruent with patients’ needs. (shrink)
    Biomedical Ethics in Applied Ethics
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 68.8Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Mental Illness as Mental: A Defence of Psychological Realism. Humana.Mente 11.
    This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether psychiatric (...) classification is regarded as useful. Position (2), which is inspired by the growing interest in neuroscience within scientific psychiatry, leads to biological realism or essentialism. In this paper we endorse a different realist position, which we label psychological realism. Psychiatric disorders are identified and addressed on the basis of their psychological manifestations which are often described as violations of epistemic, moral or social norms. A couple of examples are proposed by reference to the pathological aspects of delusions, and the factors contributing to their formation. (shrink)
    Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 68.6Jason Bridges, Kolodny on the Normativity of Rationality.
    Although in everyday life and thought we take for granted that there are norms of rationality, their existence presents severe philosophical problems. Kolodny (2005) is thus moved to deny that rationality is normative. But this denial is not itself unproblematic, and I argue that Kolodny’s defense of it—especially his Transparency Account, which aims to explain why rationality appears to be normative even though it isn’t—is unsuccessful. I close with a sketch of an alternative proposal, one that provides for a genuine (...) normative role for rationality while defusing the attendant problems. (shrink)
    Reasons and Rationality in Philosophy of Action
    Normativity in Value Theory, Miscellaneous
    In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 68.5Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2008). Delusional Beliefs and Reason Giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):801-21.
    Philosophers have been long interested in delusional beliefs and in whether, by reporting and endorsing such beliefs, deluded subjects violate norms of rationality (Campbell 1999; Davies & Coltheart 2002; Gerrans 2001; Stone & Young 1997; Broome 2004; Bortolotti 2005). So far they have focused on identifying the relation between intentionality and rationality in order to gain a better understanding of both ordinary and delusional beliefs. In this paper Matthew Broome and I aim at drawing attention to the extent to which (...) deluded subjects are committed to the content of their delusional beliefs, that is, to whether they can be regarded as authors of their beliefs (Moran 2001). We consider several levels of commitment one can have to a reported belief, delusional or otherwise, and we distinguish between _ownership_ and _authorship_ of beliefs (Gallagher 2000). After examining some examples of belief authoring (or lack thereof) in psychopathology, we argue that there is no straight-forward and unitary answer to the question whether deluded subjects author their beliefs. Nevertheless, introducing the notion of authorship in the debate can significantly contribute to the philosophical literature on the rationality of delusions and can also have important implications for diagnosis and therapy in psychiatry. (shrink)
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 68.3Martin Brüne (2006). Evolutionary Psychiatry is Dead – Long Liveth Evolutionary Psychopathology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):408-408.
    Keller & Miller (K&M) propose that many psychiatric disorders are best explained in terms of a genetic watershed model. This view challenges traditional evolutionary accounts of psychiatric disorders, many of which have tried to argue in support of a presumed balanced polymorphism, implying some hidden adaptive advantage of the alleles predisposing people to psychiatric disorders. Does this mean that evolutionary ideas are no longer viable to explain psychiatric disorders? The answer is no. However, K&M's critical evaluation supports the view that (...) psychiatric disorders are not categorically distinct from normalcy, and that evolutionary psychopathology should be grounded in rigorous empirical testing. (Published Online November 9 2006). (shrink)
    Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology
    Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..




  • Applied ethicsEpistemologyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
    Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionMore ...
    Home | Blog | New books and articles | Philosophy journals | Forums | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | Contact us
    Sponsored by the Joint Information Systems Committee as part of the
    Information Environment Programme

    Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
    All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers where applicable.

    loading ..