Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders

Mind and Language 16 (5):457-493 (2001)
Psychiatric treatment and diagnosis rests upon a richer conception of normativity than, for example, cognitive neuropsychology. This paper explores the role that considerations of rationality can play in defining this richer conception of normativity. It distinguishes two types of rationality and considers how each type can break down in different ways in delusional psychiatric disorders.
Keywords Disorder  Normativity  Psychiatry  Rationality  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0017.00179
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alexandre Billon (2014). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.
G. YounG (2008). Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Model. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):863-876.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

126 ( #16,844 of 1,725,417 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

12 ( #56,104 of 1,725,417 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.