Personal and sub‐personal; A difference without a distinction

Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations.

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Jose Luis Bermudez
Texas A&M University

References found in this work

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.

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