David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82 (2000)
This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and farts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory adequacy require postulating horizontal explanatory relations
|Keywords||Behavior Metaphysics Personal Sub-personal|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
Matteo Colombo (2012). Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Psychology (ahead-of-print):1â24.
Manuel de Pinedo-Garcia & Jason Noble (2008). Beyond Persons: Extending the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction to Non-Rational Animals and Artificial Agents. Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):87-100.
Similar books and articles
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.
Michael Quante (2007). The Social Nature of Personal Identity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):56-76.
Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism. Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
Martin Davies (2000). Persons and Their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.
Matthew Elton (2000). Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
Sebastian Gardner (2000). Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.
Martin Davies (2000). Interaction Without Reduction: The Relationship Between Personal and Subpersonal Levels of Description. Mind and Society 1 (2):87-105.
Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal; a Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63 – 82.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads172 ( #3,836 of 1,101,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #19,954 of 1,101,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?