Prospects for epistemic compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104 (2006)
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
Keywords Compatibilism  Epistemology  Externalism  Internalism  Justification  Knowledge  Perspectivism  Sosa, Ernest
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DOI 10.2307/4321790
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References found in this work BETA
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Sven Bernecker (2008). Agent Reliabilism and the Problem of Clairvoyance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):164–172.

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