Prospects for epistemic compatibilism

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104 (2006)
Abstract
This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Keywords Compatibilism  Epistemology  Externalism  Internalism  Justification  Knowledge  Perspectivism  Sosa, Ernest
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References found in this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
John Greco (2002). ``Virtues in Epistemology&Quot;. In Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. 287--315.

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