Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104 (2006)
|Abstract||This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels|
|Keywords||Compatibilism Epistemology Externalism Internalism Justification Knowledge Perspectivism Sosa, Ernest|
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