Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129 (2002)
|Abstract||In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alexei Angelides (2004). The Last Collapse? An Essay Review of Hilary Putnam's the Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):402-411.
Louise Cummings (2001). Self-Refutations and Much More: The Dialectical Thinking of Hilary Putnam. Theoria 16 (2):237-268.
Hilary Putnam (1982). Beyond the Fact--Value Dichotomy. Crítica 14 (41):3--12.
Narve Strand (2011). Putnam and the Political. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (7):743-757.
H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
Hilary Putnam (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Harvard University Press.
J. J. C. Smart (1999). Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction. Philosophy 74 (3):431-437.
Sean Sayers (2003). Review of Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. [REVIEW] Radical Philosophy (122):52-53.
Gordon Steinhoff (1986). Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:352 - 363.
Christopher Norris (2002). Hilary Putnam: Realism, Reason, and the Uses of Uncertainty. Distributed in the U.S. By Palgrave.
D. C. Smith (2003). What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intentionality? Philosophical Papers 32 (1):83-96.
Charles E. Cardwell (1972). A Note on Putnam and the Transitivity of the Real. Philosophical Studies 23 (6):414 - 417.
Henry Jackman (2001). Semantic Pragmatism and A Priori Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):455 - 480.
Mark Sprevak & Christina McLeish (2004). Magic, Semantics, and Putnam's Vat Brains. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 35 (2):227-236.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads20 ( #68,179 of 722,745 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,745 )
How can I increase my downloads?