David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Utilitas 11 (01):37- (1999)
Moral pluralism of the kind associated with W. D. Ross is the doctrine that there is a plurality of moral principles, which in their application to particular cases can conflict, and that there is no further principle to determine which of these principles takes priority in cases of conflict. Two objections are commonly advanced against this kind of pluralism: that it proposes a rag-bag of moral principles lacking a unifying basis; and that it offers no way to adjudicate moral disputes when our intuitions about what to do conflict. The present paper replies to both of these objections, in particular by responding to versions of them advanced by Brad Hooker. The tying together and justification of different moral principles may be achieved by a general rational justification procedure, rather than by a further moral principle; and such a rational justification procedure can help to adjudicate moral disputes
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Berys Gaut (1993). Moral Pluralism. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):17-40.
Robert B. Talisse (2011). Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):87-100.
Peter S. Wenz (1993). Minimal, Moderate, and Extreme Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 15 (1):61-74.
Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):583-601.
William Edelglass (2006). Moral Pluralism, Skillful Means, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Philosophy 3 (2):8-16.
H. T. Engelhardt (2011). Confronting Moral Pluralism in Posttraditional Western Societies: Bioethics Critically Reassessed. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):243-260.
R. J. Royce (1982). Pluralism, Tolerance and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 11 (3):173-180.
Michael B. Gill & Shaun Nichols (2008). Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):143-163.
J. Baird Callicott (1990). The Case Against Moral Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 12 (2):99-124.
Sandra B. Rosenthal (1996). Toward a New Understanding of Moral Pluralism. Business Ethics Quarterly 6 (3):263-275.
Michael Lacewing (2002). A Relative Defence. Think 3 (3):69-75.
Joaquín Jareño Alarcón (2006). Value Pluralism and Valuable Pluralism. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:91-95.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2014). Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 79 (2):259-277.
Ragnar Francén (2010). Moral Motivation Pluralism. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Added to index2010-08-30
Total downloads15 ( #107,856 of 1,101,120 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #81,278 of 1,101,120 )
How can I increase my downloads?