History and Philosophy of Logic 3 (1):69-83 (1982)
|Abstract||In a seminal paper of 1923 on vagueness, Bertrand Russell discussed some of the most important problems concerning the nature of vagueness, its extension within the language, and its relation to truth and logic. The present paper inquires into Russell's theory. The following topics will be analysed and discussed in turn in sections 1?5: Russell's definition of vagueness; his claim that all phrases are vague; his theory of the source of the vagueness in our language; his principles for the transmission of vagueness; and his claim that logic is incompatible with vagueness. This paper is an attempt to give a rational reconstruction of Russell's position as expressed in his paper. Compatible passages in other of his works are also studied|
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