David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy 2 (5):20-27 (1927)
The question of substance in the philosophy of physics has three branches: logical, physical, and epistemological. The first is a problem in pure philosophy: is the notion of “ substance ” in any sense a “ category,” i.e. forced upon us by the general nature either of facts or of knowledge? The second is a question of the interpretation of mathematical physics: is it necessary, or convenient to interpret our formulae in terms of permanent entities with changing states and relations? The third concerns the relation of perception to the physical world
|Keywords||Substance Philosophy of science Perception|
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