Self-knowledge and the Bounds of authenticity

Erkenntnis 71 (1):107 - 121 (2009)
This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p ’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p , is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p . Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

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