David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 71 (1):107 - 121 (2009)
This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p ’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p , is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p . Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.
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References found in this work BETA
Alan R. Anderson & Nuel D. Belnap (1975). Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Neccessity, Vol. I. Princeton University Press.
Sven Bernecker (1996). Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.
Sven Bernecker (2007). Remembering Without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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