Self-deception, intentions and contradictory beliefs

Analysis 60 (4):309-319 (2000)
Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be divided into two broad groups – the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist. On intentionalist models what happens in the central cases of self-deception is parallel to what happens when one person intentionally deceives another, except that deceiver and deceived are the same person. This paper offers a positive argument for intentionalism about self-deception and defends the view against standard objections.
Keywords Belief  Contradiction  Epistemology  Externalism  Intention  Self-deception
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00247
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