Online research in philosophy

This paper analyzes Hobbes’s understanding of signification, the process whereby words come to have meaning. Most generally, Hobbes develops and extends the nominalist critique of universals as it is found in Ockham and subsequently carried forward by early moderns such as Descartes. Hobbes’s radicality emerges in comparison with Ockham and Descartes, as, unlike them, Hobbes also reduces the intellectual faculty entirely to imagination. According to Hobbes, we have nothing in which a stabilizing, pre-discursive mental language could inhere. Hobbes thus concludes that all thinking is affective and semiotic, and depends on the regulation of conventionally established regimes of signs. Establishing this regulation is one of the central functions of the Hobbesian commonwealth.

Abstract The learning associated with the hidden curriculum is likely to be unconscious. This raises questions about the moral standing of the hidden curriculum, which seems to violate two basic rights of the pupils: (1) the right to decide for themselves what they wish to study; (2) the right to be aware of the forces that have influenced them. Seeing as hidden curricula are unavoidable components of all education, this raises questions about the morality of education itself. It is thus the task of the school to raise the hidden curriculum to the consciousness of the pupils, in order to protect them from its influence. ?Raising the hidden curriculum to consciousness? can be interpreted in different ways. The strategies associated with the relevant interpretations are problematic. However, their implementation is essential for the moral education of the pupils.

In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes defines moral philosophy as 'the science of Virtue and Vice', yet few modern readers take this description seriously. Moreover, it is typically assumed that Hobbes' ethical views are unrelated to his views of science. Influential modern interpreters have portrayed Hobbes as either an amoralist, or a moral contractarian, or a rule egoist, or a divine command theorist. David Boonin-Vail challenges all these assumptions and presents a new, and very unorthodox, interpretation of Hobbes's ethics. He shows that Hobbes is best understood as embracing a theory of virtue concerned with the development of good character traits rather than with rules of behaviour. In focusing in a quite new way on Hobbes's moral theory this book is likely to attract considerable attention amongst both philosophers and intellectual historians.

This book gives a comprehensive treatment of Thomas Hobbes' thought in the light of the most important research currently being produced by historians, philosophers, and political scientists. His life and political, religious, and scientific views are explained within the cultural context of Stuart England.

This is a short (1,000 word) introduction to Hobbes's materialism, covering (briefly) such issues as what the relevant notion of materialism is, Hobbes's debate with Descartes, and what Hobbes's arguments for materialism were.

I show that for any quantum dynamics and any choice of observables as hidden variables an adequate hidden variable theory always exists. I argue that hidden variable theories have no more problems in reconciling non-locality with relativity than no-hidden-variable theories.

The hidden-variable theorems of Bell and followers depend upon an assumption, namely the hidden-variable assumption, that conflicts with the precepts of quantum philosophy. Hence from an orthodox quantum perspective those theorems entail no faster-than-light transfer of information. They merely reinforce the ban on hidden variables. The need for some sort of faster-than-light information transfer can be shown by using counterfactuals instead of hidden variables. Shimony’s criticism of that argument fails to take into account the distinction between no-faster-than-light connection in one direction and that same condition in both directions. The argument can be cleanly formulated within the framework of a fixed past, open future interpretation of quantum theory, which neatly accommodates the critical assumptions that the experimenters are free to choose which experiments they will perform. The assumptions are compatible with the Tomonaga- Schwinger formulation of quantum field theory, and hence with orthodox quantum precepts, and with the relativistic requirement that no prediction pertaining to an outcome in one region can depend upon a free choice made in a region spacelike-separated from the first.

Recent work in Hobbes scholarship has raised again the subject of Hobbes's notion of liberty. In this paper, I examine Hobbes's use of the notion of liberty, particularly in his theory of rights. I argue that in describing the rights that individuals hold, Hobbes is employing "liberty" to cover more than the famously restrictive definition of the "absence of external impediments" and that this broader understanding of liberty should not be put down to simple inconsistency on Hobbes's part. In the second part of the paper, I look at the Hohfeldian analysis of rights and at the tendency to see the notion of a claim as foundational for rights, which for some, is a legacy of that analysis. I argue that there are disadvantages to this and suggest that the notion of liberty may be a more useful one than that of a claim to ground our understanding of rights.