Skeptical theism and Rowe's new evidential argument from evil

Noûs 35 (2):278–296 (2001)
Abstract
Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis against objections, thereby supporting my contention that relying on its falsity is a weakness in an argument
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Scott Sehon (2010). The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):67 - 80.
    William Hasker (2010). All Too Skeptical Theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1):15-29.
    Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.
    John Bishop & Ken Perszyk (2011). The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument From Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):109-126.

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