David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410 (2011)
What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key to resolving the force-field puzzle is to take a more nuanced view of how conceptual constraints can be accountable to data and observation. This can be done by developing conceptual arguments in conjunction with interpretative frameworks for making sense of experimental evidence. This paper shows how attending to important differences between different types of mindreading yields tools for interpreting experimental and observational data in a manner consistent with a (conceptually derived) constraint that I have developed elsewhere. This is the first-order constraint that second-order thinking, or thinking about thinking, is only available to language-using creatures
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
José Luis Bermúdez (2009). Mindreading in the Animal Kingdom. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.
José Luis Bermúdez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
Josep Call & Michael Tomasello (2008). Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (5):187-192.
Donald Davidson (1975). Thought and Talk. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press. 1975--7.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter Carruthers (2009). Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate (2011). Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.
Peter Carruthers (2013). Mindreading in Infancy. Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.
Robert W. Lurz & Carla Krachun (2011). How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others' Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli's Problem. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):449-481.
Chuang Liu (2003). Gauge Gravity and the Unification of Natural Forces. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):143 – 159.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). The Puzzle of Attention, the Importance of Metaphors. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):331-351.
Marcelo Neves (2007). The Symbolic Force of Human Rights. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (4):411-444.
Siu L. Chow (1995). In Defense of Experimental Data in a Relativistic Milieu. Philosophical Explorations.
Andrea Manfrinati, Pierdaniele Giaretta & Paolo Cherubini (2008). Conditionals and Conditional Thinking. Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34.
Peter Carruthers (2002). The Cognitive Functions of Language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):657-674.
K. Brad Wray (2010). Philosophy of Science: What Are the Key Journals in the Field? Erkenntnis 72 (3):423 - 430.
Hilary Greaves (2010). Towards a Geometrical Understanding of the CPT Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):27-50.
Added to index2011-09-15
Total downloads45 ( #37,942 of 1,102,981 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #24,626 of 1,102,981 )
How can I increase my downloads?