David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165 (2004)
One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism fail
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Richard Fumerton (1998). Review: Replies to My Three Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):927 - 937.
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Peter D. Klein (2000). The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism. Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Bergmann (2007). Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification? Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
Timo Kajamies (2009). A Quintet, a Quartet, a Trio, a Duo? The Epistemic Regress Problem, Evidential Support, and Skepticism. Philosophia 37 (3):525-534.
Frederik Herzberg (2014). The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence. Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
Ted Poston (2012). Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
David Karl Kauf (1954). A Comment on Hochberg's Reply to Storer. Philosophical Studies 5 (4):57 - 58.
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