Why the capability approach is justified

Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (1):16–25 (2007)
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Abstract

Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach has in the past twenty years become an increasingly popular and influential approach to issues in global justice. Its main tenet is that when assessing quality of life or asking what kind of policies will be more conducive to human development, we should look not to resources or preference satisfaction, but to what people are able to be and to do. This should then be measured against a more or less narrow conception of what any human being should be able to be and do, i.e. which functions are essentially human. To have a capability is to be able to function in that way. Thomas Pogge has recently argued that despite its many attractions, the capability approach did not present a sufficiently strong challenge to Rawlsian resourcism. In this paper, I address Pogge's criticisms of the capability approach, and I argue that from the point of view of Nussbaum's Aristotelian version of the approach, his objections are not successful.

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Author's Profile

Sandrine Berges
Bilkent University

Citations of this work

Recovery From Natural and Man-Made Disasters As Capabilities Restoration and Enhancement.C. Murphy & P. Gardoni - 2008 - International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning 3 (4):1-17.

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References found in this work

What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
Can the Capability Approach Be Justified?Thomas W. Pogge - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (2):167-228.

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