Über John Rawls' politischen Liberalismus
Peter Lang (1998)
| Abstract | (In German.) The book addresses Rawls's post-1985 political liberalism. His justification of political liberalism -- as reflected in his arguments from overlapping consensus -- faces the problem that liberal content can be justified as reciprocally acceptable only if the addressees of such a justification already endorse points of view that suitably support liberal ideas. Rawls responds to this legitimacy-theoretical problem by restricting public justification's scope to include reasonable people only, while implicitly defining reasonableness as a substantive liberal virtue. But this virtue-ethical grounding of political liberalism is itself unreasonable. The phenomenon of disharmony of practical reason gives the reasonable reasons to take it that political legitimacy does not obtain if and where moral-political principles are acceptable from their point of view only. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Rawls Liberalism Reason Public Justification Justice Legitimacy | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
  |
| External links |
 Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJames Boettcher (2004). What is Reasonableness? Philosophy and Social Criticism 30 (5-6):597-621.
Thomas M. Besch (forthcoming). On Political Legitimacy, Reasonableness, and Perfectionism. Public Reason.
Alan Carter (2006). Political Liberalism and Political Compliance: Part 2 of the Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls’s Theories of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):135-157.
Fabienne Peter (2007). Rawls' Idea of Public Reason and Democratic Legitimacy. Journal of International Political Theory 3 (1):129-143.
Enzo Rossi (2010). Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Liberal Legitimacy. Public Reason 2 (2):21-39.
David Dyzenhaus (1996). Liberalism After the Fall: Schmitt, Rawls and the Problem of Justification. Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (3):9-37.
Philip Cook (2009). Fairness Consensus and the Justification of the Ideal Liberal Constitution. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 22 (1):165-186.
Thomas M. Besch (2004). On Practical Constructivism and Reasonableness. Dissertation, University of Oxford
Jonathan Quong (2005). Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (3):301-330.
William Glod (2010). Political Liberalism, Basic Liberties, and Legal Paternalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):177-196.
Alan Carter (2006). The Evolution of Rawls's Justification of Political Compliance: Part 1 of the Problem of Political Compliance in Rawls's Theories of Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):7-21.
Sebastiano Maffettone (2001). John Rawls. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):189-216.
Glen Newey (2011). Toleration as Sedition. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (3):363-384.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-06-14Total downloads67 ( #13,206 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)27 ( #1,721 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
