Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):59-82 (2012)
This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning
Keywords Logical Knowledge  Change in View  Dispositions  Propositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9672-3
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Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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