Graduate studies at Western
Social Epistemology 17 (1):55 – 63 (2003)
|Abstract||This paper analyses conceptual change. A rejection of pure experience has prompted philosophers of science to adopt a certain perspective from which to view changes of belief. Popper, Kuhn, and others have analysed conceptual change in terms of problems or anomalies, that is, in terms of contingent reasoning about issues posed in the context of an inherited web of belief. This paper explores a more general analysis of conceptual change in dialogue with these philosophers of science. Because changes of belief are not all changes in scientific belief, we seek to unpack conceptual change in terms of dilemmas, as opposed to anomalies or problems. For a start, the notion of a dilemma has to be broader than that of an anomaly since it purports to apply to conceptual change as a whole, not just the transition from one era of normal science to another. In addition, we should detach the notion of a dilemma from the objectivism of Popper's world-3 problems.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Xiang Chen & Peter Barker (2000). Continuity Through Revolutions: A Frame-Based Account of Conceptual Change During Scientific Revolutions. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):223.
Vasso Kindi & Theodore Arabatzis (2008). The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science. In Stella Vosniadou (ed.), Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change. Routledge.
Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives. Hokkaido University Press.
Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker (2013). Theory Change as Dimensional Change: Conceptual Spaces Applied to the Dynamics of Empirical Theories. Synthese 190 (6):1039-1058.
Nancy J. Nersessian (1989). Conceptual Change in Science and in Science Education. Synthese 80 (1):163 - 183.
Otávio Bueno (2008). Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures. Studia Logica 89 (2):213 - 235.
Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.
Ingo Brigandt, An Alternative to Kitcher's Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept.
Paul R. Thagard (1990). Concepts and Conceptual Change. Synthese 82 (2):255-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #9,885 of 739,303 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,303 )
How can I increase my downloads?