David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 54 (3):277-297 (2001)
It is not well known that in his Göttingen period (1900–1916) Edmund Husserl developed a kind of direct reference theory, anticipating,among other things, the distinction between referential and attributive use of adefinite description, which was rediscovered by Keith Donnellan in 1966 and further analysed by Saul Kripke in 1977. This paper defends the claim that Husserl''s idea of the mental act given voice to in an utterance sheds new light on that distinction and particularly on cases where semantic referent and speaker''s referent diverge. It is argued that whenembedded in a dynamic theory of intentionality, the idea of giving-voice-to allows for a pragmatic (as opposed to a purely semantic) analysis of such cases. In Section 1 an example involving a referentially used description is presented, and the view that descriptions that can be used both attributively and referentially are thus ambiguous is criticized. Section 2 is concerned with Husserl''s discussion of a case where someone seems to demonstratively refer to something that he mistakes for something else. On thebasis of this discussion, a dynamic conception of the intentional content (and referent) of the mental act given voice to in an utterance is developed. Section 3 applies this neo-Husserlian conception to the example described in Section 1. Finally, it is shown how this conception serves to elucidate the referential/attributive distinction.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Logic Ontology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lilian Alweiss (2009). Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl's Account of Intentionality. Inquiry 52 (1):53 – 78.
Similar books and articles
Murali Ramachandran (1995). Methodological Reflections on Two Kripkean Strategies. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:67 - 81.
Kent Bach (2004). Descriptions: Points of Reference. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Clarendon Press 189-229.
Murali Ramachandran & Nadja Rosental (2000). The Ambiguity Thesis Vs. Kripke's Defence of Russell: Further Developments. Philosophical Writings 14:49-57.
Thomas D. Bontly (2005). Conversational Implicature and the Referential Use of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):1 - 25.
Louis deRosset (2010). Reference and Response. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99999 (1):1-18.
A. Bezuidenhout (1997). Pragmatics, Semantic Undetermination and the Referential/Attributive Distinction. Mind 106 (423):375-409.
Samuel C. Rickless (2012). Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition. Theoria 78 (1):6-25.
Edward Kanterian (2011). Kripke's Metalinguistic Apparatus and the Analysis of Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):363-387.
Genoveva Marti (2008). Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions. Dialectica 62 (1):43–57.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #100,344 of 1,793,059 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #169,529 of 1,793,059 )
How can I increase my downloads?