Contextualism and the background of (philosophical) justification

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):291-305 (2007)
Abstract
I propose to apply a version of contextualism about knowledge to the special case that represents the topic of this volume. I begin by motivating my preferred version of contextualism, which may be labelled as conventionalist contextualism; here I start from a well-known problem that besets epistemic internalism (section I). Following this, I pose a problem for conventionalist contextualism and argue that it can be solved by invoking, first, the idea of what I shall call the lifewordly background of epistemic justifi cation, an idea originating from Husserl and Wittgenstein, and, secondly, the associated notion of normality, to be found in Husserl (section II). Finally, I apply the resulting conception of justification to philosophical knowledge, particularly focussing on the special role of intuitions (section III).
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