Graduate studies at Western
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 7 (2):209-222 (1976)
|Abstract||Summary This paper attempts to distinguish the methods of the constitution of a realm of scientific objects from the methods of their mathematical representation. In its investigations into the procedures for forming quantitative concepts analytical philosophy of science has thematized the numerical representation of empirical relational systems (metricizing). It is the task of an historical epistemology to identify the methods and historical processes through which relams of phenomena have been made representable in such a way (quantification). In preparing such investigations conceptual distinctions are made, in particular between quantities and scales|
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