Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of theories

Erkenntnis 39 (3):359-382 (1993)
  Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this second contention, yet by and large correct in the first
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Connectionism  Epistemology  Semantics
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DOI 10.1007/BF01128508
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Smolensky (1988). On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.

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Stephen Mills & Paul K. Moser (1997). Critical Notices. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):95 – 110.

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