Graduate studies at Western
Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39 (1995)
|Abstract||I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned|
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Connectionism Energy Psychology Science|
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