Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability

Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39 (1995)
Abstract
I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned
Keywords Cognitive Science  Connectionism  Energy  Psychology  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,731
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

11 ( #135,134 of 1,098,638 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #285,836 of 1,098,638 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.