Is Cognition an Autonomous Subsystem?
| Abstract | In standard approaches, cognition is assumed to be a distinct functional module from action and interaction, on the one hand, and motivation, on the other hand. I argue that the apparent possibility of such modularization is itself a consequence of a false underlying presupposition concerning the nature of representation. An alternative model of representation is outlined, and it is shown that action and motivation emerge naturally and necessarily as aspects of one single underlying ontology of the interactive agent. | |||||||||
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