David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30 (1992)
Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry
|Keywords||Brain Cognitive Mind Reductionism Science Davidson, D|
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John Bickle (1995). Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
James Maclaurin (2011). Against Reduction. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):151-158.
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