Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism

Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30 (1992)
Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry
Keywords Brain  Cognitive  Mind  Reductionism  Science  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1086/289663
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James Maclaurin (2011). Against Reduction. Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):151-158.

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