Online research in philosophy

Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems.

An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...) Further properties of consciousness, such as differentiated qualities of experience, including qualia, emerge with conscious reflection. In particular, qualia are not constituents or direct properties of consciousness per se. Assuming that they are so is a common and ultimately disastrous misconstrual of the problems of consciousness. (shrink)

In the fields of psychology, AI, and philosophy there has recently been theoretical activity in the cognitively-based modelling of emotions. Using AI methodology it is possible to implement and test these complex models, and in this paper we examine an emotion model called ACRES. We propose a set of requirements any such model should satisfy, and compare ACRES against them. Then, analysing its behaviour in detail, we formulate more requirements and criteria that can be applied to future computational models of (...) emotion. In arguing to support the new requirements, we find that they are desirable for autonomous systems in general. We also show how they can explain the psychological concept of regulation. Finally, we use the concepts developed to make a theoretical distinction between emotion and motivation. (shrink)

Merker makes a strong case for the upper brain stem as being the neural home of primary or phenomenal consciousness. Though less emphasized, he makes an equally strong and empirically supported argument for the critical role of the mesodiencephalon in basic emotion processes. His evidence and argument on the functions of brainstem systems in primary consciousness and basic emotion processes present a strong challenge to prevailing assumptions about the primacy of cognition in emotion-cognition-behavior relations. (Published Online May 1 2007).