Graduate studies at Western
Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58 (1992)
|Abstract||The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available|
|Keywords||Mental States Mind Realizability Reductionism Science|
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