Multiple realizability and psychophysical reduction

Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58 (1992)
The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available
Keywords Mental States  Mind  Realizability  Reductionism  Science
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DOI 10.2307/27759270
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