Some Consequences (and Enablings) of Process Metaphysics

Axiomathes 21 (1):3-32 (2011)
The interactivist model has explored a number of consequences of process metaphysics. These include reversals of some fundamental metaphysical assumptions dominant since the ancient Greeks, and multiple further consequences throughout the metaphysics of the world, minds, and persons. This article surveys some of these consequences, ranging from issues regarding entities and supervenience to the emergence of normative phenomena such as representation, rationality, persons, and ethics
Keywords Metaphysics  Process  Supervenience  Emergence  Normativity  Function  Representation  Action  Rationality  Modality  Persons  Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10516-010-9130-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,661
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 59 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Mark H. Bickhard (2004). Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation. Axiomathes - An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 14:135-169.
Daniel Nolan (2009). Consequentialism and Side Constraints. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):5-22.
James Maclaurin & Heather Dyke (2012). What is Analytic Metaphysics For? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):291-306.
Mark H. Bickhard (2002). Mind as Process. In F.G. Riffert & Marcel Weber (eds.), Searching for New Contrasts. Vienna: Peter Lang 285-294.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

69 ( #49,355 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #147,227 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.