Abduction and Modality

Abstract
This paper introduces a modal epistemology that centers on inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction). In introducing this abduction-centered modal epistemology, the paper has two main goals. First, it seeks to provide reasons for pursuing an abduction-centered modal epistemology by showing that this epistemology aids a popular stance on the mind-body problem and allows an appealing approach to modality. Second, the paper seeks to show that an abduction-centered modal epistemology can work by showing that abduction can establish claims about necessity/possibility (i.e. modal claims)—where ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ denote metaphysical necessity and possibility, ways things may or may not have been given how they actually are
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    References found in this work BETA
    D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
    Alan Baker (2003). Quantitative Parsimony and Explanatory Power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):245-259.

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    George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.
    Woosuk Park (2012). Abduction and Estimation in Animals. Foundations of Science 17 (4):321-337.
    Ilkka Niiniluoto (1999). Defending Abduction. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):451.
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